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Abstract
Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) has received recent attention due
to the massive collection and mining of personal data, but remains im-
practical due to its large computational cost. Garbled Circuits (GC) is
a protocol for implementing SFE which can evaluate any function that
can be expressed as a Boolean circuit and obtain the result while keeping
each party’s input private. Recent advances have led to a surge of garbled
circuit implementations in software for a variety of different tasks. How-
ever, these implementations are inefficient and therefore GC is not widely
used, especially for large problems. This research investigates, implements
and evaluates secure computation generation using a heterogeneous com-
puting platform featuring FPGAs. We have designed and implemented
SIFO: Secure computational Infrastructure using FPGA Overlays. Unlike
traditional FPGA design, a coarse grained overlay architecture is adopted
which supports mapping SFE problems that are too large to map to a
single FPGA. Host tools provided include SFE problem generator, parser
and automatic host code generation. Our design allows re-purposing an
FPGA to evaluate different SFE tasks without the need for reprogram-
ming, and fully explores the parallelism for any GC problem. Our system
demonstrates an order of magnitude speedup compared with an existing
software platform.
∗Xin Fang is currently affiliated with Qualcomm. The bulk of this research was done at
Northeastern University.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
01
71
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 N
ov
 20
19
1 Introduction
The statistical analysis of data collected from human subjects has a long his-
tory in empirical sciences such as medicine, sociology, and economics. It has
recently also become a ubiquitous practice among Internet companies, occurring
presently at a massive and an unprecedented scale. Companies like Google, Net-
flix, and Amazon routinely monitor and mine a broad array of behavioral signals
collected from their users, and monetize it through targeted advertising or per-
sonalized product recommendations. Behavioral data collection is therefore of
considerable business value to online companies [1]; moreover, there are often
benefits to society at large, as in aiding the detection of epidemics [2] or terrorist
threats [3], in assessing news or product penetration [4], and in political online
polling [5]. On the other hand, these practices have also given rise to privacy con-
cerns and threats, documented extensively by researchers [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
as well as the popular press [1, 13].
1.1 Secure Function Evaluation
This state of affairs gives rise to the following challenge: given the benefits of
mining behavioral data to both online companies and to society at large, is it
possible to enable data mining practices without jeopardizing user privacy? A
series of recent research efforts [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] have attempted to address
this issue through cryptographic means and, in particular, through secure func-
tion evaluation (SFE). SFE allows an interested party to evaluate any desirable
polynomial-time function over private data, while revealing only the answer and
nothing else about the data. This offers a strong privacy guarantee: an entity
executing a secure data-mining algorithm over user data learns only the final
outcome of the computation, while the data is never revealed to the entity. SFE
can thus enable, e.g., a data analyst, a medical professional, or a statistician,
to conduct a study of sensitive data without jeopardizing the privacy of the
participants (online users, patients, etc.).
Any algorithm to be executed over amounts of data at the scale encountered
in the above settings needs to be highly efficient and scalable. SFE over private
data therefore poses a significant challenge, as it comes at a considerable addi-
tional computational cost compared to execution in the clear. Prior work has
made positive steps in this direction, showing that a variety of important data
mining algorithms [14, 15, 16] can be computed using Yao’s Garbled Circuits
(GCs) [20, 21] in a parallel fashion. The function to be evaluated is converted
to a binary circuit which is “garbled” in such a way that an evaluator of the
circuit learns only the values of its output gates. Execution of this circuit is
subsequently parallelized, e.g., over threads [15] or across a cluster of machines
[16]. Nevertheless, this approach to parallelization leaves much to be desired:
for example, in [16], even under parallelization over 128 cores, executing a typi-
cal data-mining algorithm like Matrix Factorization (MF) through SFE is of the
order of 105 slower compared to (parallel) execution in the clear. In practice,
this means that applying MF to a dataset of 1M entries requires roughly 11
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days under SFE, a time largely prohibitive for practical purposes.
1.2 FPGA Overlays
There has been a surge of interest in FPGAs in the data center, as evidenced
by a large number of systems that have recently become available. Amazon
is offering FPGA instances through Amazon Web services [22], Microsoft has
the Catapult system [23] and IBM offers cloud FPGA [24]. In this paper, we
advocate leveraging hardware acceleration to tackle the scalability and efficiency
challenges inherent in SFE. FPGAs are an excellent hardware platform for the
implementation of SFE primitives and, in particular, garbled circuits. This is
precisely because FPGAs are tailored to executing many low level operations
in parallel. The types of operations encountered in garbled circuits (namely,
garbling and un-garbling gates) fit this pattern precisely: they involve, e.g., a
series of symmetric key encryptions, XORs, and other well-defined primitive
operations (see Section 2). Thus, an FPGA implementation of SFE benefits
from both high speed evaluation and hardware-level parallelization.
The amount of computation required to evaluate a garbled circuit for an
application at the usual data-mining scale cannot fit in a single FPGA. Thus,
evaluating a function securely entails partitioning computations into sub-tasks
to be programmed and evaluated over a single FPGA. A practical implementa-
tion therefore needs to allow repurposing an FPGA to quickly compute different
SFEs or different sub-tasks of a larger SFE. For this reason, tailored approaches
that are tied to the execution of a specific SFE structure, and require full repro-
gramming of an FPGA with each new execution, cannot be applied efficiently
to the types of SFE problems we wish to address. To address these challenges,
we propose a generic, reconfigurable implementation of SFE as a coarse-grained
FPGA overlay architecture. As FPGAs have become more dense and capable of
holding a large number of gate equivalents, there has been an increased interest
in FPGA overlay architectures [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. An FPGA overlay
consists of two parts: (1) a circuit design implemented on the FPGA fabric
using the usual design flow, and (2) a user circuit mapped onto that overlay
circuit. Garbled circuits are excellent candidates for an FPGA overlay design.
Precisely because components of a garbled circuit follow a generic structure,
an overlay approach that does not reprogram FPGAs from scratch, but simply
reroutes connections between elementary components (in our case, garbled AND
and XOR gates) leads to important efficiency improvements.
1.3 Contributions
This paper introduces SIFO: Secure computational Infrastructure using FPGA
Overlays. We make the following contributions:
• We provide a complete work flow to map any garbled circuit problem to
garbled circuit overlay cells on an FPGA, including software (SFE problem
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generator, parser, and scheduler) and FPGA overlay circuit to accelerate
the GC problem.
• Our workflow and tools enable accelerating any garbled circuit operation
without requiring knowledge of the underlying implementation. We inte-
grate our implementation with FlexSC [32] which uses ObliVM [33] as the
backend for any garbled circuit operation. In conjunction with our tools,
each problem is analyzed and layers of operations that can be executed in
parallel are extracted. The resulting circuit is then mapped to our FPGA
overlay architecture for processing.
• Our FPGA overlay architecture handles different parts of the same GC
problem (if a problem is too large to fit in a single FPGA) as well as dif-
ferent GC problems without reprogramming. The FPGA is programmed
once for all garbled circuit problems. Wiring and instantiation are de-
termined at execution time by the controller and the host. This overlay
architecture is scalable and enables users to avoid the long design and
compile time on FPGAs for new problems. The overhead for a new prob-
lem is very low, simply requiring the transfer of initial data and circuit
information from host to device.
• We demonstrate the benefits of our approach by mapping a large number
of circuit examples onto a heterogeneous computing platform featuring a
Stratix V FPGA. We tackle different aspects of performance bottlenecks
and alleviate them. This includes (a) investigating different numbers of
FPGA overlay cells, (b) optimizing the host to FPGA communication via
PCIe, and (c) managing on-chip block memory to minimize accesses to off-
chip DDR memory. We compare the performance of these improvements
for various problems and show significant speed-up against the naive de-
sign and against a software implementation, ranging from 6.21 to 45.78
times faster than the latter. Many of the optimizations presented can be
applied to other FPGA projects as well.
This journal paper represents an extension to our previously published re-
search [34], which presented an implementation where the entire GC problem
fit on a single FPGA, with all intermediate results fitting into on-chip memory
(block RAM). In the research presented here, we relax that constraint to signifi-
cantly increase the size of problems supported. This introduces new challenges,
since with GC, data is randomly accessed. Our new implementation treats block
RAM as user managed cache, and investigates how best to access data so that
data fetching does not become a bottleneck.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 covers back-
ground information on garbled circuits as well as related work. The design
methodology is presented in Section 3, which demonstrates the methodology
of how we tackle the garbled circuit problem in a heterogeneous reconfigurable
system, and how we alleviate bottlenecks in the system to improve overall per-
formance. Experiments and corresponding results are presented in Section 4.
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Finally, we present our conclusions and future work. Material in this article are
excerpted from the first author’s PhD dissertation [35].
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the relevant background on garbled circuits, includ-
ing terminology and techniques. Related work on garbled circuit implementa-
tions is also discussed.
2.1 Garbled Circuits
Our research accelerates Secure Function Evaluation (SFE), specifically Garbled
Circuits (GC), using FPGAs. In this model there are two or more users with
data which they wish to keep private, and a function to be evaluated over that
data. All parties know the function being evaluated and learn the outcome
of the evaluation, but users do not reveal their data. A canonical problem
exemplifying SFE is the “Millionaires’ Problem”: two millionaires wish to know
who is worth more without revealing their personal worth to each other.
Garbled circuits were initially introduced by Yao [21] for two users and has
been extended to multiple users. They rely on cryptographic primitives. In the
variant we study here (adapted from [36, 15]), Yao’s protocol runs between (a) a
set of private input owners, (b) an Evaluator, who wishes to evaluate a function
over the private inputs, and (c) a third party called the Garbler, that facilities
and enables the secure computation.
Garbled Circuits work for any problem that can be expressed as a Boolean
circuit. In our and many other implementations, this function is represented as
a circuit made up of AND and XOR gates1. The Evaluator wishes to evaluate
a function f , represented as a Boolean circuit of AND and XOR gates, over
private user inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn. We break the problem into three phases, as
shown in Fig. 1. In Phase I, the Garbler “garbles” each gate of the circuit,
outputting (a) a “garbled circuit,” namely, the garbled representation of every
gate in the circuit representing f , and (b) a set of keys, each corresponding to a
possible value in the string representing the inputs x1, . . . , xn. These values are
shared with the Evaluator. In Phase II, through proxy oblivious transfer [37],
the Evaluator learns the keys corresponding to the true user inputs. In the final
phase, the Evaluator uses the keys as input to the garbled circuit to evaluate
the circuit, ungarbling the gates. At the conclusion of Phase III, the Evaluator
learns f(x1, . . . , xn). To ensure privacy of users’ data and to protect against
side channel attacks, both garbling and evaluation are run whenever user data
changes. Hence garbling is done as often as evaluation.
1Recall that AND and XOR gates form a complete basis for boolean circuits.
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Figure 1: Yao’s Protocol Phases of Operation
2.1.1 Garbling Phase
A function to be evaluated is represented as a Boolean circuit consisting of
AND and XOR gates. In the garbling phase, each of these gates is garbled as
described in this section. Each gate is associated with three wires: two input
wires and one output wire. At the beginning of the garbling phase, the Garbler
associates two random strings, k0wi and k
1
wi , with each wire wi in the circuit.
Intuitively, each kbwi is an encoding of the bit-value b ∈ {0, 1} that the wire wi
can take.
wi
wj
wk
bi bj f(bi, bj) Garbled value
0 0 0 Enc(k0wi ,k
0
wj
,g)(k
0
wk )
0 1 0 Enc(k0wi ,k
1
wj
,g)(k
0
wk )
1 0 0 Enc(k1wi ,k
0
wj
,g)(k
0
wk )
1 1 1 Enc(k1wi ,k
1
wj
,g)(k
1
wk )
Figure 2: A Garbled AND Gate
We describe here how to garble an AND gate. The same principles can be
applied to garble an XOR gate, using its respective truth table. We note however
that, in practice, XOR gates are handled via the Free XOR optimization [38],
discussed in Section 2.1.3. A garbled AND gate is shown in Fig. 2. For each
AND gate g where g is the gate number, with input wires (wi, wj) and output
wire wk, the Garbler computes the following four ciphertexts, one for each pair
of values bi, bj ∈ {0, 1}:
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Enc
(k
bi
wi
,k
bj
wj
,g)
(kg(bi,bj)wk ) = SHA(k
bi
wi‖kbjwj‖g) ⊕ kg(bi,bj)wk (1)
Here SHA represents the hash function, ‖ indicates concatenation, g is an
identifier for the gate, and ⊕ is the XOR operation. Note that each value k on
a wire is implemented with 80 bits in our implementation. The “garbled” gate
is then represented by a random permutation of these four ciphertexts. Observe
that, given the pair of keys (k0wi , k
1
wj ) it is possible to successfully recover the
key k1wk by decrypting c = Enc(k0wi ,k
1
wj
,g)(k
1
wk
) through2:
Dec(k0wi ,k
1
wj
,g)(c) = SHA(k
bi
wi‖kbjwj‖g) ⊕ c. (2)
On the other hand, the other output wire key, namely k0wk , cannot be recovered.
More generally, it is worth noting that the knowledge of (a) the ciphertexts, and
(b) keys (kbiwi , k
bj
wj ) for some inputs bi and bj yields only the value of key k
g(bi,bj)
wk ;
no other input or output keys of gate g can be recovered. Any Boolean function
can be garbled in this manner, by first representing it in AND and XORs, and
garbling each such gate.
2.1.2 Evaluation Phase
The output of the garbling process is (a) the garbled gates, each comprising a
random permutation of the four ciphertexts representing each gate, and (b) the
keys (k0wi , k
1
wi) for every wire wi in the circuit. At the conclusion of the first
phase, the Garbler sends this information for all garbled gates to the Evaluator.
It also provides the correspondence between the garbled value and the real bit-
value for the circuit-output wires (the outcome of the computation): if wk is a
circuit-output wire, the pairs (k0wk , 0) and (k
1
wk
, 1) are given to the Evaluator.
To transfer the garbled values of the input wires, the Garbler engages in a
proxy oblivious transfer with the Evaluator and the users, so that the Evaluator
obliviously obtains the garbled-circuit input value keys kbwi corresponding to the
actual bit b of input wire wi.
Having the garbled inputs, the Evaluator can “evaluate” each gate, by de-
crypting each ciphertext of a gate in the first layer of the circuit by applying
equation (2): only one of these decryptions will succeed3, revealing the key
corresponding to the output of this gate. Each output key revealed can subse-
quently be used to evaluate any gate that uses it as an input. Using the table
mapping these keys to bits, the Evaluator can learn the final output.
2Note that the above encryption scheme is symmetric, as Enc and Dec are the same
function.
3This can be detected, e.g., by appending a prefix of zeros to each key kbwk , and checking
if this prefix is present upon decryption.
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2.1.3 Optimization
Several improvements over the original Yao’s protocol have been proposed, that
lead to both computational and communication cost reductions. These include
point-and-permute [39], row reduction [40], and Free-XOR [38] optimizations,
all of which we implement in our design. Free-XOR in particular significantly re-
duces the computational cost of garbled XOR gates: XOR gates do not need to
be encrypted and decrypted, as the XOR output wire key is computed through
an XOR of the corresponding input keys. In addition, the free-XOR optimiza-
tion fully eliminates communication between the Garbler and the Evaluator for
XOR gates: no ciphertexts need to be communicated for these gates. Our imple-
mentation takes advantage of all of these optimizations; as a result, the circuit
for computing garbled AND gates differs slightly from the garbling algorithm
outlined above.
2.2 Related Work
Acceleration of garbled circuits is a hot research area in the SFE field. Re-
searchers use different parallel models and hardware platforms to speed up ex-
ecution. These platforms include FPGAs, CPUs, and GPUs.
2.2.1 FPGA and ASIC designs
TinyGarble [41] uses techniques from hardware design to implement GCs as
sequential circuits and then optimizes these designs. The circuits can be opti-
mized to reduce the non-XOR operations using traditional high-level synthesis
tools and simulation.
The offline circuit synthesis will provide a ready-to-use circuit description
for any garbled circuit problem. The resulting designs are customized for each
problem; thus for each new problem a new circuit must be generated. In ad-
dition, their results describe simulations, but no actual hardware implementa-
tion. [42, 43] describe the first FPGA implementations of GC. In both these
implementations, there is limited parallelism to allow garbling to happen in a
small footprint. In [42], two FPGA-based prototypes are described, a system-
on-chip with access to a single hardware cryptographic accelerator core, and
a stand-alone hardware implementation targeting ASICs. In [43] the authors
use a non-standard garbling technique in order to reduce communication. Our
approach uses standard GC techniques as implemented in popular software im-
plementations. In addition, our architecture aims to reduce the computational
cost of garbling by using much more parallelism than these early FPGA imple-
mentations. For starters, we implement four SHA cores in hardware for each
garbled AND gate. In addition, we implement as many garbled AND gates as
we can keep busy at the same time, and implement garbled circuits directly on
top of an efficient overlay, which eliminates the need to recompile the hardware
for every new user problem. With MAXelerator [44] the authors implement a
very efficient garbling of matrix multiplication in FPGAs. While their design
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is more efficient for matrix multiplication, ours is more general purpose and
supports any problem that a user may wish to garble.
2.2.2 CPU
One approach to accelerating GC on CPUs is to provide instructions that sup-
port encryption to speed up the base operations. JustGarble [45] shows that
using AES-NI (Advanced Encryption Standard New Instruction), circuits can
be garbled and evaluated faster than using traditional instructions. Intel AES-
NI is a new encryption instruction set that improves AES operations in the
Intel Xeon processor family. Others have proposed a 32-bit MIPS architecture
specifically implemented with instructions to support SFE. GarbledCPU [46] is
a MIPS-based general-purpose sequential processor which enables the high-level
description of garbled circuits in hardware. Problems to be evaluated securely
are compiled to MIPS assembler and then run securely on their garbled MIPS
processor. The goal of this project is to fabricate the MIPS core; FPGAs are
used for prototyping the design. Using MIPS assembly code to represent the
problem being evaluated alleviates the problem of lengthy FPGA place and
route cycles. However, the availability of this specialized hardware is likely
to be limited. Our approach introduces more parallelism than either of these
CPU approaches, as we implement many hashing cores in parallel. In addition,
through an overlay, we can rapidly switch between problems.
2.2.3 GPUs
Researchers have used GPUs for hardware implementations of garbled circuits.
Fastplay [47] uses a GPU architecture to accelerate garbling arithmetic opera-
tions and achieves a 35 to 40x improvement over a serial implementation. Fred-
ericksen et al. [48] implement a protocol based on cut-and-choose of garbled
circuits for malicious situation using GPUs. Husted et al. [49] implement free-
XOR, pipeline, and OT extension on GPUs which exploit some of the parallel
nature of these tasks. They report on the difference between implementations on
Single Instruction Multiple Data (SIMD) architecture of GPUs and on Multiple
Instruction Multiple Data (MIMD) architectures for multi-core CPUs. They
also comment on the difficulty of comparing different implementations. Husted
assumes a malicious adversary, and thus implement k different versions of a
Garbled Circuit which gives them increased parallelism. We assume an “honest
but curious” adversary, which results in less parallelism.
2.2.4 Summary
Our approach, SIFO, differs from prior art with respect to (a) the level of
parallelism implemented, (b) the ability to support any user problem, and (c) the
ease to change between problems without requiring regeneration of the FPGA
circuit.
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3 System Design Methodology
Our approach implements a coarse-grained overlay architecture to accelerate GC
problems. Garbled AND and XOR gates are implemented on an FPGA along
with memory and control for support. Software tools support the mapping of
different garbled circuit problems onto this overlay architecture and leverage the
interaction between hardware and software while maintaining small communi-
cation and memory access overhead. We describe the hardware architecture
(Sec. 3.1), software structure (Sec. 3.3), and discuss why an overlay architecture
is needed. We conclude the section with a discussion of optimizations imple-
mented for performance improvement.
To demonstrate the utility of FPGAs in the datacenter for accelerating GC,
we start with circuits generated from FlexSC based on ObliVM [33]. FlexSC
is a software framework that allows developers without any cryptography ex-
pertise to convert algorithms expressed in a high-level language to GC. FlexSC
generates a gate netlist of the problem to be garbled, where gates are restricted
to AND and XOR gates. This research takes this netlist and processes it on an
FPGA and compares it the same processing done by FlexSC on a CPU. In this
paper we focus on garbling. Our recent results [50] show that garbling takes
up about two thirds of the total run time and is thus the bottleneck in our
overall design. In this paper we focus on garbling; accelerating evaluation will
be addressed in future work.
The overall process starts from user data and a problem to be garbled. The
steps required are generating the netlist for the garbled circuit, mapping that
netlist onto implementations of AND and XOR gates, generating the garble
tables for the evaluator, and then transmitting the table for each AND gate to
the evaluator. The evaluator receives data inputs from the users via oblivious
transfer. In the process of garbling, we use FLEXSC to generate the netlist and
use the wire numbers from that netlist as the memory locations for each wire.
Software that runs on the host processor does layer abstraction to process a
circuit in breadth first order, assigns AND operations in the garbled circuit to
specific AND gates on the FPGA. Hence, what is communicated to the FPGA
is wire IDs and gate numbers for garbling. The garble tables are transferred
back to the host processor for transfer to the evaluator. This flow is shown in
Fig. 6 and described more completely in this section.
3.1 Hardware Architecture
3.1.1 gAND and gXOR Overlay Cells
The garbled AND cells required for garbled circuit generation are much more
complicated than single bit operations. To emphasize this fact, we refer to them
as gAND in the reminder of this paper. Each wire of the gAND is represented
with 80 bits. A basic garbling AND operation implements the functionality
described in Section 2.1. The design we use, shown in Fig. 3, implements the
row-reduction [40] and “free”-XOR [38] optimizations. Each line of the truth
10
Optimized Garbled AND Gate
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Figure 3: Optimized Garbled AND Overlay Cell
table is implemented according to Eq. 1. This implementation requires four
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 1 cores, although only three output values need
to be transmitted to the evaluator. K00 , K
0
1 are two garbled values representing
the value 0 on the wire for a gAND operation. R is a global variable based on
which the cipher can get the garbled value represented by all zeros. For any
wire i, K0i ⊕ K1i = R. The implementation still uses four SHA-1 primitives
which run in parallel; however only three values in the garbling table need to
be stored; reducing the size of the garble table by 25%. Since all values in the
garble table need to be transmitted to the host, and later to the evaluator, this
optimization also results in a 25% saving in the amount of data that needs to be
transmitted for each gAND gate. The implementation includes two arbitrators
for the four outputs of the SHA-1 operations. The first arbitrator decides the
sequence of the result and picks one of them to XOR with the other three. The
second arbitrator rearranges the sequence of those three values and stores them
in the garble table. Note that these arbitrators do not introduce any latency to
the system. The latency of a gAND gate is 82 cycles, which is determined by
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the latency of the SHA-1 core. The implementation, based on an open source
core [51], uses 512-bit values derived from the garbled inputs and additional
information. gAND requires 82 clock cycles on the FPGA and uses 3070 ALMs
and 3750 one bit registers on our target hardware, a Stratix V FPGA.
There are several things to note about this implementation. First, SHA-1 is
known to be vulnerable; however, since new keys are generated for every new
problem and new set of inputs, this is not a concern in the context of GC. A
user who wants a stronger privacy guarantee can replace the SHA-1 cores with
AES or another cryptographic primitive. This may reduce the performance in
our implementation as the number of cores that can be implemented in parallel
could be reduced. Second, other optimizations have been introduced, most
importantly the half-AND gate [52], which reduces the amount of data that
needs to be transmitted between garbler and evaluator. This optimization will
not accelerate garbling, the focus of this paper, but will reduce communication
costs. These and other optimizations can easily be introduced into the design
of gAND and will be considered in the future. Note that SHA was chosen in
order for us to compare our performance directly to a widely used software
implementation, FlexSC [32].
The Garbled Circuit XOR overlay cell (referred to as gXOR) benefits from
the “free” XOR protocol [38]. A free gXOR gate consists of 80-bit plaintext
XOR operations. For any garbled circuit operation, it is guaranteed that using
the free XOR approach will have the same privacy guarantees as using standard
cryptographic primitives. This optimization means that gXOR is both much
smaller and much faster than gAND. Note that the gXOR gate is combinational
and thus has no latency. Note that the time to garble an XOR operation is less
than the time to transfer the input and output wire information from the host
processor. However, it is still advantageous to do this in FPGA hardware since
the input and output garbled values stay local to the FPGA and would otherwise
have to be communicated back to the host.
3.1.2 FPGA Overlay Architecture
Fig. 4 shows the overlay architecture we use for garbled circuit acceleration.
This architecture includes the gAND and gXOR circuits described above, a
Workload Dispatcher and Data Controller (described below), Block RAM that
is used as an on-chip cache and a DDR memory interface for accessing the main
memory for the problem being garbled. An architectural decision in our overlay
design is how many gAND and gXOR gates to instantiate. We experimented
with different numbers of AND and XOR overlay cell combinations; the results
are presented in Sec. 4.
3.1.3 Workload Dispatcher and Data Controller
The workload dispatcher and data controller is responsible for fetching garbled
values from memory based on input and output addresses, delivering input data
to the correct gAND or gXOR overlay cell, and writing back the results to mem-
12
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Figure 4: Hardware Architecture
ory after each operation. The timing of the entire system is determined by the
states in this module. Fig. 5 shows the timing information of the workload
dispatcher and data controller, which implements the following steps: (1) deter-
mining the type of the next batch of operations sent from the host, (2) reading
input values from memory and forwarding them to the correct overlay cell, and
(3) writing the output result back to the corresponding location in memory.
Our design uses both on-chip block RAM (BRAM) and off-chip DDR memory.
States in the FSM are added depending on the type of memory accessed. An
entry using block RAM for storage will wait for only one clock cycle for a read
or write; however, for DDR memory, the memory access operation has vari-
able latency and is not finished until the “complete” flag is raised. One of the
challenges of GC is that memory locations are accessed in random order, hence
timing and organization of memory is complicated. We currently use on-chip
BRAM as a cache for values that would otherwise be stored in off-chip memory.
A detailed discussion of different memory optimizations is presented in Sec. 4.
The on-chip BRAM is organized with a single read port and single write port
with 108-bit data, of which 80 bits are used. 6.75 Mbits of BRAM is used in this
design to store values. Multiple BRAMs on the chip can be accessed in parallel.
However, the random access nature of memory accesses makes it challenging to
take full advantage of this feature. The on-board memory is accessed using 512
bit reads and writes, and four garbled values are accessed in one data word.
Two data ports are available in parallel. The port widths are dictated by the
architecture of the Gidel ProceV board.
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3.2 Why use an Overlay Architecture?
Table 1: Gate Information for Problems
Problem Layers Input Wires Output Wires ANDs XORs Gates # Reprogram
6-bit adder 17 12 6 6 24 30 1
10-bit HD 22 20 10 20 90 110 1
30-bit HD 27 60 30 60 270 330 6
50-bit HD 32 100 50 100 450 550 10
8-bit mult 57 16 16 120 352 472 12
16-bit mult 121 32 32 496 1472 1968 50
32-bit mult 249 64 64 2016 6016 8032 201
64-bit mult 505 128 128 8128 24320 32448 813
10 4-bit sorting 278 40 40 848 4638 5486 85
5× 5 4-bit m mult 25 100 200 3900 11600 15500 390
10× 10 4-bit m mult 27 400 800 7526 22489 30015 753
5× 5 8-bit m mult 57 200 400 15800 47200 63000 1580
10× 10 8-bit m mult 57 800 1600 127200 380800 508000 12720
20× 20 4-bit m mult 37 1600 3200 254400 761600 1016000 25440
The examples used in Sec. 4 are shown in Table 1. These problems are
addition, Hamming Distance (HD), multiplication, sorting, and matrix multi-
plication. We also analyze scalability of our design by testing several different
sizes of these problems. Note that FlexSC tries to maximize the number of XOR
gates uses as XOR gates are much less computationally expensive to implement
with the free XOR optimization [38]. Thus the percentage of gates that are
AND gates never exceeds 26% in our examples.
The last column of Table 1 shows the number of times the FPGA would
need to be reprogrammed assuming layers are processed one at a time and 10
garbled AND gates are implemented on the FPGA. We assume as many XORs
as needed can be accommodated, as XORs take much less time and space to
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Table 2: Problem Switching Time
Our Workflow Traditional Workflow
Hardware Architecture Software Generation Hardware Design
One Time Compile Minutes Every problem
less than one hour minutes to hours
process, as discussed above. These examples motivate the need for an overlay
architecture.
The FPGA architecture is implemented as a coarse grained overlay circuit
with a sea of gates approach, where the implemented gates are gAND and gXOR.
Using this architecture, any user problem can be mapped to the garbling hard-
ware with no need to reprogram the FPGA, and the results are available rapidly.
This is in contrast to the traditional FPGA design workflow which would require
synthesis, place and route as well as downloading a new bitstream for each new
problem. In our approach, all that is needed is to program the FPGA ahead
of time and generate the software host code for each problem. The overlay
architecture can be reused without recompilation, while the traditional FPGA
workflow has to go through the entire tool flow. The traditional approach is
infeasible for garbling large problems as many recompilations would be required
for a single problem. Each compilation can take minutes to hours. Using the
overlay architecture, we compile the hardware once, and generate the software
in minutes. Let’s assume that we used a very efficient program, such as Tiny-
Garble [41], to generate each instance of a problem. Lets further assume that
TinyGarble can fit a design with 100 garbled AND cores on an FPGA, i.e. it is
ten times more efficient in hardware usage compared to our approach. To han-
dle multiple problems, such as those in a data center setting, each new problem
would need to be generated, placed and routed, and this takes on the order of
tens of minutes. Hence, our approach is more efficient even for those problems
that fit entirely on one FPGA. For large problems, such as the larger matrix
multiply problems in Fig. 1, the FPGA would have to be reprogrammed more
than a hundred times, a process that would require hours. The overlay approach
provides an architecture that maps different designs to the FPGA without re-
quiring reprogramming. Thus the end-to-end run time of an application with
FPGAs is faster than the end-to-end run time using FlexSC, as presented in
Sec. 4. We summarize this discussion in Table 2.
3.3 Software Workflow
This section discusses the software workflow including problem generation, prob-
lem parsing, layer extraction, and code generation.
3.3.1 Problem Generation and Validation
Our design makes use of our GC Overlay architecture, SIFO, in a way that
is seamless for a user of FlexSC. FlexSC, based on ObliVM [33], is a software
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Figure 6: Garbled Circuit Generator: Hardware and Software
framework that allows developers without any cryptography expertise to convert
algorithms expressed in a high-level language to GC. We modify FlexSC to
output the netlist for a garbled circuit problem. This research extends FlexSC
by taking the netlist, consisting of gAND and gXOR gates, and processing it
on an FPGA. We use the same optimizations as FlexSC, namely free XOR [53]
and row reduction [40]. In its normal operation, FlexSC outputs the results of
garbling each gate; we use these values for verification. Note that input values
are random and generated for each new computation. These are generated on
the host and used for both the FlexSC and FPGA versions to ensure consistent
results. The speed and validity of results can thus be easily compared.
The netlist generated by FlexSC is garbled in breadth first order. To support
this, we generate layer information, and separate each layer into a “batch” of
operations, where each batch represents the number of gates that can be garbled
in parallel on the FPGA, and is implementation specific. As the netlist can be
quite large, it may require many batches to garble a single layer. A typical
Boolean gate generated from FlexSC has the form: wire ID1 AND/XOR wire
ID2 = wire ID3. We use WireIDs as memory addresses; intermediate data from
garbling needs to be stored. We use both on-chip and on-board memory for this
purpose.
Our hardware consists of an FPGA board connected to a PC via PCIe.
Fig. 6 highlights the workflow for garbling a circuit that involves both software
running on a CPU (on the right of the figure) and FPGA design (on the left).
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Figure 7: CPU and FPGA Communication without Overlap
The host transfers the information to the FPGA for processing. We auto-
matically generate the host code for each problem through our tools. The host
code for a user problem is responsible for initial data transmission, assigning
gates in the problem to specific gAND or gXOR instances on the FPGA, and
allocating the output of each garbling operation to memory.
Fig. 7 shows the timeline for one batch of Boolean operations for the work-
load dispatcher and data controller, assuming that all information is transferred
from the host before the batch begins operation. This is improved on by overlap-
ping communication and computation as described in the optimization section.
3.3.2 Problem Parser and Layer Extractor
The problem parser analyzes the generated gate netlist From FlexSC for gate,
wire and layer information. The output consists of the total number of wires
representing the total number of memory locations required, and, for each AND
gate and XOR gate, the addresses that correspond to the input and output wires.
Other output includes information for separating wires into different groups
(on-chip or on-board) which is used in implementing the hardware memory
hierarchy. We consider several different approaches for using on-chip memory
effectively. Analysis of results for sample problems is presented in Section 4.1.
We process gates in breadth first order. The netlist generated from FlexSC
is fed to a layer extractor which extracts each layer of the circuit that can be
garbled in parallel. We also identify the primary input values whose wire ID
is not the output of any gate. Layer extraction identifies the AND and XOR
gates that can be processed at the same time. For most problems, an entire
layer will not fit onto the implemented FPGA overlay architecture. Thus, a
single layer may take several rounds. We refer to the number of gates that map
directly onto the FPGA as a batch. Each operation in a batch is assigned a
gate ID that corresponds to the gate it uses in HW. Wire numbers for input
and output wires are used as the addresses in memory where input and output
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values are stored. The processor assigns wire IDs and gate IDs and transmits
this information to the FPGA. At the end of a batch, the processor transmits
the next batch of information, and continues until the circuit is fully garbled.
Within a batch, all gates belong to the same layer of the circuit. Note that
the amount of information transferred from host to FPGA minimal. The data
remains on the FPGA; only memory addresses and gate IDs are transmitted.
3.3.3 Host Code Generation
We developed the tools to automatically generate the host code based on any
garbled circuit operation. The input is the layer information from the layer
extractor. This tool generates the batches and assigns wire IDs and gate IDs
for different problems. Initial input data is generated and sent to the FPGA.
For very large problems the host code separates the main function into groups of
smaller problems to avoid exceeding the heap size allocated for a problem. The
tools support debug mode, as well as different allocation policies for memory,
which are discussed in more detail below. More details can be found in [35].
3.4 Optimizations
There are two major sources of bottlenecks in our design. The first is transferring
data over PCIe. The second is the delay in accessing on-board memory. In
this section we address optimizations to the design that mitigate both of these
bottlenecks.
3.4.1 PCIe Communication and FPGA Memory
The first few optimizations target improving communications over the PCIe
bus. In our implementation, for each gate, the location of the input and output
wire values and the gate type: AND or XOR needs to be communicated. Since
the circuits representing problems to be garbled are large, this information is
transferred as a batch of operations at a time.
Our first optimization involves overlapping communication and computa-
tion of gate and wire information, as shown in Fig. 8. Overlay cells can start
working as soon as the information for a new Boolean operation has been trans-
mitted. For different batches, the same gates implemented as part of the overlay
architecture are reused for different garbled gates in the user design. This opti-
mization is applied in all subsequent designs and in all reported results. Another
optimization we apply is to remove unnecessary handshaking signals between
the host and the FPGA.
The communication channel between the host and FPGA supports direct
communication to data registers on the FPGA or, using DMA, to on-board DDR
memory. We use DMA to transmit the initial data (values on input wires) to
DDR memory. We directly transfer gate information to on-chip registers. The
time for the host to write to one register on the FPGA is 50 ns. As there are
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tion
three addresses for a Boolean gate, the data transmission time is 150 ns per
gate in a batch.
ADD 1 ADD 2 ADD 3
31 0 31 011 10 22 21                           1
Figure 9: Reducing Number of Registers
An optimization we apply is to pack more than one address into a register
to reduce the number of transfers required. We use two registers to represent
the three addresses needed for each gate. The total width of 2 addresses is
2 registers ∗ 32 bits/register = 64 bits and the actually bit-width for each ad-
dress location in our design is b64/3c = 21 bits. Besides the flag bit representing
the memory type, there will be 20 bits for a real address, which is enough to
represent about one million wires. Fig. 9 shows this optimization. We are inves-
tigating generating memory addresses locally to the FPGA, which will remove
this limitation.
3.4.2 Hybrid Memory Hierarchy
The second source of bottleneck in our design is transfers between the FPGA
and the on-board DDR memory. Accesses to DDR memory require many clock
cycles with a latency of about 180ns, and, as wires are not accessed in sequential
order, we cannot take advantage of burst mode. Block RAM available on the
FPGA has much faster access times of one clock cycle (5ns for a 200MHz CLK),
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but is not large enough to support the size of problems we are processing. To
address this issue, we make use of a hybrid memory hierarchy where some values
are stored in on-chip memory while most values are stored off-chip. In essence,
we are using the on-chip memory as a cache. However, unlike a traditional
cache, the policy for using the cache is completely under user control.
Fig. 4 shows the hardware architecture using both the block RAM (BRAM)
inside the FPGA and the DDR memory on board. Our previous work only used
on-chip BRAM and thus was limited in the size of problems garbled [34]. In
this research we investigated two different allocation policies, for block RAM.
We refer to these as directly-used and most-frequently-used. Results for both
policies are reported in Sec. 4. Software on the host determines whether a wire
is stored in block RAM or in DDR. A single bit in the address indicates which
it is. Wire IDs are generated on the host, so the code that generates wire
IDs also implements the memory policy. Using a bit to indicate the location
reduces the number of addressable memory locations, but also removes the need
to implement hardware to track locations of specific locations.
Addresses for wires are used to store values that represent the output of the
garbled gate. These values are used in generating the garbled values for the next
gate; however they are not transmitted to the evaluator. Only the garble tables
need to be transmitted. Hence values are stored in memory for the duration of
the garbling computation across all layers, but are not needed after that.
Some wires are generated as outputs from one gate and feed directly into
another gate. In other words, their fanout is 1. In the directly-used policy we
store the values generated on wires that are directly used in block RAM to save
the time to store and fetch these values. The criteria for such a value to be
stored in block RAM are: (1) the wire is used only once after it is generated
and (2) the Boolean gate which uses this wire ID is in the adjacent layer. The
directly used policy saves significant memory bandwidth. The second criteria
of only using values in an adjacent layer allows block RAM space to be reused
once the garbled value is no longer needed. For the directly-used policy we use
a ping-pong buffering approach, where half the block RAM in any layer is used
for reading and the other half for writing, and these roles are swapped with each
layer. A total of 13 Megabits of on-chip BRAM is used.
For the most-frequently-used policy, the host code analyzes the complete
netlist that is generated, and identifies the wires that are most frequently used.
These values are stored in block RAM for the duration of their lifetime. This
policy is similar to a most frequently used cache allocation policy; however in
our design, the values are never stored in DDR RAM. The goal behind this
policy is to reduce the number of reads and writes to off-chip memory. The host
code sorts wire IDs based on their number of accesses and assigns those wires
with a large number of accesses to block RAM. Once block RAM cannot fit
more wires, the rest of the wire IDs are assigned to addresses in DDR Memory.
We do not currently reuse memory locations; this is planned for future work.
Table 3 shows wire information. Each wire corresponds to one memory
location. The more wires, the more memory needed to store the values that
correspond to the output of each garbled gate. The problems have a wide range
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Table 3: Wire Information for Problems
Problem Wire A Wire B Gate C Gate Max D Wire/Layer
6-bit adder 42 12 12 0 1 2.5
10-bit HD 140 55 50 5 7 6.4
30-bit HD 420 163 147 11 22 15.6
50-bit HD 700 293 269 24 37 21.9
8-bit mult 495 296 247 49 64 8.7
16-bit mult 2015 1232 1007 225 256 16.7
32-bit mult 8127 5024 4063 961 1024 32.6
64-bit mult 32639 20288 16319 3969 4096 64.6
10 4-bit sorting 5717 2968 2136 832 40 20.6
5× 5 4-bit m mult 16175 9700 8350 1350 2000 647.0
10× 10 10 10 4-bit m mult 31472 18768 16051 2717 3809 1165.6
5× 5 8-bit m mult 64375 39400 32850 6550 8000 1129.4
10× 10 8-bit m mult 517500 317600 263400 54200 64000 9078.9
20× 20 4-bit m mult 1050800 635200 541600 93600 128000 28400.0
A: 1-to-1 wire;
B: gate with one 1-to-1 wire from adjacent layer;
C: gate with one 1-to-1 wire NOT from adjacent layer;
D: Max number of 1-to-1 wires in a layer.
Table 4: Wire Percent for Problems
Problem Percent A Percent B Percent C
6-bit adder 28.57% 100.0% 28.6%
10-bit HD 39.29% 90.9% 35.7%
30-bit HD 35.00% 90.2% 38.8%
50-bit HD 41.86% 91.8% 38.4%
8-bit mult 59.80% 83.4% 49.9%
16-bit mult 61.14% 81.7% 50.0%
32-bit mult 61.82% 80.9% 50.0%
64-bit mult 62.16% 80.4% 50.0%
10 4-bit sorting 51.92% 72.0% 37.4%
5× 5 4-bit m mult 59.97% 86.1% 51.6%
10× 10 4-bit m mult 59.63% 85.5% 51.0%
5× 5 8-bit m mult 61.20% 83.4% 51.0%
10× 10 8-bit m mult 61.37% 82.9% 50.9%
20× 20 4-bit m mult 60.45% 85.3% 51.5%
Percent A: Percent of 1-to-1 wire in all wires;
Percent B: 1-to-1 wires to be used in the next layer of all 1-to-1 wires;
Percent C: 1-to-1 wires to be used in the next layer of all wires
of number of wires from several dozen to over one million wires. There are two
types of wires, 1-to-1 wires and 1-to-N wires. 1-to-1 wires include two types:
wires where the output is immediately used in the next layer, and wires where
the output is not immediately used. We use the first type in the directly-used
policy. There are also 1-to-1 wires not in adjacent layers and 1-to-n wires where
one output is used multiple times. The maximum number of 1-to-1 wires in a
layer is the number of memory locations needed in Block RAM for directly-used
policy if all 1-to-1 wires are kept on chip.
Table 4 shows the percentage of each type of wire. Percent A is the number
of 1-to-1 wires among all the wires. Most of the 1-to-1 wires are used in the
next layer, represented in Percent B. Percent C shows the percent of the 1-to-1
wire to be used in the next layer among all the wires. These data show that the
directly-used policy is a good fit for many garbled circuit problems, and may
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require less on-chip memory compared to the most-frequently-used policy.
For the hardware architecture, the workload dispatcher and data controller
is designed to accommodate this hybrid memory hardware architecture. The
controller monitors the flag of the address provided by the host, and determines
whether the value should be stored in Block RAM or DDR. We embed the flag
as the last bit of the address, and if zero, the location is DDR; otherwise it is
block RAM. Timing results for both of the implemented policies are presented
in the next section.
4 Experiments and Results
We compare our results to FlexSC [32] both for correctness and for performance.
For software timing, we run FlexSC on an Intel Core i7 processor running at
3.6GHz, using any optimizations implemented in FlexSC. Our target hardware
platform consists of a host PC and FPGA card, specifically the ProceV board
from Gidel. The ProceV board hosts a Stratix V FPGA with two DDR3 exter-
nal memories each of which can support 8GB, or a total of 16GB. It provides
communication between host and FPGA via a PCIe Gen 3 bus with 8 lanes, each
of which supports 8 Gigatransfers per second. Our results show the end-to-end
effect of replacing FlexSC garbling in software with an FPGA solution.
In our results, we examine the effect of the basic overlay architecture that we
implemented, as well as each of the optimizations discussed in Sec. 3. Note that
all of the results presented use overlapped communications and computation as
described in Sec. 3.4.1. In the reported results, the FPGA clock is 200 MHz.
The interface clock responsible for data transmission between host and FPGA
is running at 300MHz. Timing results compare the FPGA design to an Intel
processor running the same algorithm at 3.6 GHz.
4.1 Problem Analysis
The problems we analyze are addition, Hamming Distance (HD), multiplication,
sorting, and matrix multiplication. We also analyze scalability of our design
by testing several different sizes of these problems. Results for some of these
problems were reported in our previous publication [34]. The biggest difference
between the work presented here and our previous work is that the previous
work did not make use of off-chip memory, which significantly limited the size
of problems we can garble. The maximum number of gates in a previously
presented example was 32,000 gates. Here we analyze much larger problems,
with up to a million gates. Problem information is summarized in Table 1.
This table shows total numbers of layers, wires, and gates in the garbled circuit
problems we analyze. The examples presented are a 6-bit adder, several different
bit sizes for HD, several different bit sizes for multiplication, and an example
of sorting four bit numbers. All of these were reported previously [34]. The
new examples include different sizes of matrix multiplication that show how
the problem size scales as well as larger problems that could not fit with the
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previous approach. The largest problem reaches one million garbled circuit
operations and several thousand independent gates within each layer. Note
that the largest number of layers is not from the largest problem. Also note
that, to best take advantage of the free XOR optimization, FlexSC generates
examples that predominantly make use of gXORs; gANDs never exceed more
than 26% of total gates. In addition to these examples, we analyze different
sizes of page rank (PR) and present results below.
4.2 Heterogeneous Computing System Results
We have implemented all of the design variants described in this paper on a
Gidel ProceV board. In this section we present step by step performance im-
provements using the different optimizations described is Sec. 3. We compare
subsequent designs to one another, and also present the speedup compared to
software using FlexSC.
Table 5: Increase Number of AND Overlay Cells
Problem 5 AND Overlay (us) Speed-up 10 AND Overlay (us) Total Speed-up
6-bit adder 78 26.41 76 27.11
10-bit HD 260 9.73 257 9.84
30-bit HD 765 5.33 741 5.51
50-bit HD 1282 5.04 1210 5.34
8-bit mult 1098 8.40 1058 8.71
16-bit mult 4280 3.40 4218 3.45
32-bit mult 17406 1.94 17056 1.98
64-bit mult 71068 2.15 69858 2.19
10 4-bit sorting 12605 1.68 12375 1.71
We experiment with different numbers of overlay cells implemented in hard-
ware, as shown in Table 5. Results show speedup compared to FlexSC for 5
and 10 garbled AND gates; in both cases a single XOR overlay cell is used.
We do not observe much improvement when we increase the number of AND
gates, which indicates that this is not the bottleneck in our base design. The
bottleneck here is PCIe communications between host and FPGA board.
In the base design, the transmission time for information for each XOR
operation is larger than the garbling XOR time itself. Using this information,
we can remove any synchronization used by the host when sending XOR gates.
Note that it is still worthwhile to garble the XOR gates on the FPGA, because
Table 6: Results for Removing Host XOR Operation Check
Problem 10 AND w/o xor check (us) Additional Speed-up Total Speed-up
6-bit adder 60 1.30 34.33
10-bit HD 99 2.63 25.56
30-bit HD 216 3.43 18.89
50-bit HD 365 3.32 17.70
8-bit mult 428 2.47 21.54
16-bit mult 1420 2.97 10.24
32-bit mult 4924 3.46 6.86
64-bit mult 18673 3.74 8.20
10 4-bit sorting 2770 4.47 7.62
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the output keys generated are used in subsequent gates in the design. Knowing
that transmission time of each XOR operation is larger than the XOR operation
time, we can remove the synchronization steps and let the host keep sending
XOR gates. Table 6 shows the results of applying this optimization to the
ten garbled AND gate design. Additional speed-up is the speed-up compared
with the version with xor check and total speed-up compares this new design
with FlexSC. In this design, the host sends all the XOR operations within one
layer without synchronization before sending batches of AND operations. This
optimization contributes significant speedup, and the effect of this optimization
grows as the size of the user problem increases.
Table 7: Directly-Used Policy using block RAM and DDR Hybrid Memory
Problem 10AND + Hybrid Memory (us) Speed-up
6-bit adder 54 57.2
10-bit HD 88 28.8
30-bit HD 193 21.1
50-bit HD 302 21.4
8-bit mult 380 24.3
16-bit mult 1284 11.3
32-bit mult 4208 8
64-bit mult 15945 9.6
10 4-bit sorting 2292 9.2
Hybrid Memory consisting of block RAM on FPGA and DDR on Board
Next, we show the speedup from using both on-chip Block RAM and off-chip
DDR memory. Table 7 shows total time in µs and the speedup compared to
the software version in FlexSC. In this table, we apply the directly-used policy,
described in Sec. 3.4. The results show that the smallest speedup compared
to software is 8 times. Thus using a hybrid memory architecture results in
significant savings.
Table 8: Most-Frequently-Used Policy
Problem 10AND + Hybrid Memory 2 (us) Policy Comparison
32-bit mult 4384 1.04
64-bit mult 15648 0.98
10 4-bit sorting 2425 1.06
We also implemented the most frequently used policy using the hybrid mem-
ory system. We try three of the larger problems to compare the two policies, as
shown in Table 8. The policy comparison column compares the most frequently
used policy with the directly used policy. If it is larger than 1, then the most fre-
quently used policy is faster. Note that the results show that there is not much
difference in performance between the two policies for large problems. This is
likely due to the fact that the directly used policy reuses block RAM memory
locations, while in our current implementation, the most frequently used pol-
icy does not. In addition, the pre-processing cost for the most frequently used
policy is more expensive as the fanout of every wire needs to be computed. In
addition, to reuse memory locations, lifetimes of these wires will need to be
computed. While we plan to investigate this in the future, for now, we conclude
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that the directly used policy is the most advantageous.
Table 9: Influence of Number of Gates
Gates Number Time Speedup Compared with SW Speedup Improvement
5XOR 5AND 18677 8.20 -
10XOR 10AND 14888 10.29 1.25
15XOR 15AND 12252 12.50 1.22
64-bit multiplication problem. 300 MHz main clock and 200 MHz local clock.
For the FPGA operation we use 200MHz as the local clock. The PCIe
protocol allows us to set a different “main” clock speed for transmitting data;
for this we use 300Mz. Because the main clock is faster, the time to transmit
the operands for a garbled XOR is no longer larger than the XOR operation
time. Thus, we can not apply XOR without synchronization between the host
and FPGA. However, we can also use multiple XORs to improve the total
performance. Table 9 shows the results of using 5 AND and 5 XOR overlay
cells; 10 AND and 10 XOR; 15 AND and 15 XOR. Speedup improvement shows
that the increase from changing from 5 to 10 is 1.25 times and changing from
10 to 15 is 1.22 times. We will continue to investigate adding more gates to see
when this improvement saturates.
Table 10: Using 2 Address Registers for 3 Addresses
Problem 1 Reg as 1 address 2 Regs as 3 addresses Improvement Total Speedup
2 PR 41044 37358 1.1 12.47
3 PR 66409 58587 1.13 10.27
4 PR 90087 7.83 1.06 7.83
10AND and 10XOR overlay cells; 300 MHz main clock and 200 MHz local clock. PR is Page
Rank.
The speedup results from packing 3 addresses into 2 registers are shown
in Table 10. We use the page-ranking examples and the results show 1.06 to
1.13 speedup improvement compared with the method of using 1 register for 1
address. Note that this optimization limits the size of valid address bits that
can be used to 20, which in turn limits the size of problems that can be garbled.
Table 11: Speedup Results
Problem sw (ms) Time (us) Speedup
6-bit adder 2.06 45 45.78
10-bit HD 2.53 80 31.63
30-bit HD 4.08 171 23.86
50-bit HD 6.46 259 24.94
8-bit mult 9.22 293 31.47
16-bit mult 14.54 949 15.32
32-bit mult 33.76 3308 10.21
64-bit mult 153.13 12252 12.50
10 4-bit sort 21.12 2339 9.03
5× 5 4-bit m mult 60.66 5830 10.40
10× 10 4-bit m mult 220.81 11286 19.56
5× 5 8-bit m mult 203.86 24128 8.45
10× 10 8-bit m mult 1060.63 170895 6.21
20× 20 4-bit m mult 2170.88 340698 6.37
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We combine all of the optimizations that led to speedup and present the
results in Table 11. These results have applied the following optimizations: (1)
15 AND overlay cells and 15 XOR overlay cells; (2) Hybrid memory system with
the directly-used policy; (3) 300 MHz main clock frequency for PCIe interface
and 200 MHz local clock frequency; (4) Pipelined operation between the host
and FPGA. The results are shown for working designs on the Gidel ProceV
board and compare end-to-end system running time to the same problems run
in software using FlexSC. We observe one or two orders of magnitude speedup
across a range of problems. Note that software is running at 3.6GHz, while
the FPGA implementations are running at 200 MHz. FlexSC runs with one
thread; however parallelizing the particular implementation of GC with the
optimizations used and the “honest but curious” model is not trivial. Note that
the number of AND gates garbled per second continues to increase as the size
of the problem grows. While we see significant speedup across all problems, the
amount of speedup diminishes as the problem size grows. This is due to the fact
that on chip BRAM cannot keep as large a percent of memory locations off of
off-chip memory as the size of each layer grows and highlight the importance of
our hybrid memory optimization. We intend to continue to optimize our design
to be able to garble larger and larger problems in less elapsed time.
4.3 Bandwidth Bottleneck
Under the two optimizations we employ (“free” XOR gates [53] and garbled-row
reduction [40]), the garbler needs to send 3×80-bit ciphertexts (240 bits) to the
evaluator per AND gate, and 0 ciphertexts (0 bits) per XOR gate in the circuit.
The latter is due precisely to the use of the “free” XOR optimization: garbled
XOR gates require neither encryption during garbling nor any transmission
using this technique.
Under these optimizations, garbling is computation-bound in our setting.
Taking two cases in Table 11 (10 × 10 4-bit m mult, 20 × 20 4-bit m mult) as
examples, our processing time indicates we can process 0.67M and 0.75M AND
gates per second, respectively. These cases correspond to the case with the
largest speedup and the largest example run. At the cost of 240 bits per gate,
this garbling correspond to a required communication bandwith between garbler
and evaluator of 160.8MBps and 180Mbps, respectively. This is well within
the range of the bandwidth available at, e.g., Amazon Web Services (AWS)
EC2 instances (5GBps); this implies that a garbler and evaluator deployed by
distinct entities on AWS would be computation, not communication-bound.
We note that this observation, as well as our estimates, agree with experimental
observations of garbler-evaluator execution pairs on AWS [16].
5 Conclusions and Future work
This article demonstrates a heterogeneous reconfigurable computing system us-
ing FPGA overlay architecture for general garbled circuit operations. This
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system lets the user implement and accelerate their application without any
knowledge of either hardware development or secure function evaluation proto-
col by providing a complete workflow to transfer any garbled circuit problem
onto it. We demonstrate the benefit of using this system by showing signifi-
cant speedup compared with existing software platforms. This research makes
possible the wider adoption of using garbled circuit schemes in the future.
For the hardware architecture on FPGA, our design uses a coarse-grained
overlay architecture and enables the evaluation of different SFE tasks without
the need for reprogramming. The host side workflow includes garbled circuit
generator, problem parser, and host code generation tools which can be config-
urable for different hardware architectures. These tools explore the parallelism
for any GC problem and generate the host program based on the structure of the
problem. We also provide analytical tools to show the different characteristics
of a problem. We explore the bottlenecks while working on this heterogeneous
reconfigurable computing system and tackle them using different methods. This
exploration also provides other researchers directions for improving their own
heterogeneous system designs.
There are several directions for future research. First is the further improve-
ment of the heterogeneous system. This research may benefit from a closely
connected FPGA such as the Intel HARP to alleviate the bottleneck of the
PCIe interface. Another direction is to expand the overlay cell library to ab-
stract more complicated computational patterns using Boolean AND and XOR
operations. The current work uses garbled circuit AND and XOR overlay cells
as two components of the hardware architecture library, and this fine-grained
pattern suffers from DDR access delay in every operation. Based on Tables 3
and 4, we know that there are many 1-to-1 wires to be used in the next layer.
One solution is to build other overlay cells which consist of cross-layer Boolean
operations. Second is to separate a large problem into several small problems
which can be computed independently through several host nodes each with
its own FPGA board. This enables the expansion of the size of the problems
into even larger data mining problems, such as page ranking with more nodes
using GraphSC and eventually provide a large, scalable, efficient platform for
privacy-preserving computation. We have already begun to test these ideas
using Amazon Web Services F1 instances.
Data Availability
The examples used to support the findings of this study are available from the
corresponding author upon request.
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